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Sexual Orientation, Discrimination, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
Sharon Yecies*
Abstract
Like many governing bodies today, the United Nations is facing the question of whether
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are legitimate. In particular, there is a
current debate in the United Nations about whether Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) (providing protection against discrimination on the basis of among
other things, race, color, sex, national origin, or "other status") protects against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
This Comment will discuss the importance of this question in the UN today, and
anale whether protection based on sexual orientation is included in the UDHR based on the
text and case law under the UDHR. But because these approaches do not conclusively answer
the question, this Comment will also adopt an approachfrom political philosophy.
Using the work of Mill, Locke, and Rawls, this Comment will anay .e protection
against discrimination based on sexual orientation from two alternative positions. The first
considers whether discrimination based on sexual orientation may be necessaU to the stability of
non-oppressive states. The second considers whether such discrimination may be justified behind
a contractarian veil of ignorance. Combined, these approaches demonstrate that laws that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation may be legitimate under the UDHR
A note as to the inspiration for this paper: there has been a great deal of recent
scholarship advocating against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. There is
significanty less scholarshp, however, explaining why it may be legitimate for a state to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. In order to contribute something meaningful to
this important debate, this Comment will go through afew arguments in support of the latter
position.
J.D. Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank all
of her professors and peers at the University of Chicago Law School for fostering an environment
of tolerance and academic diversity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Morality being the noblest product of culture, it is the duty of all to
respect it."'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) encourages all UN
Member States to protect certain rights.2 In particular, its goal is to encourage
Erica-Irene A. Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Lan: A Study on the Individual's Duties to the
Community and the Limitaions on Human Rights and Freedoms under Aricle 29 of the Universal Declaration
ofHuman Rights 120 (United Nations 1990).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Res No 217 A (III), UN Doc A/810
at 71 (1948), online at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a2 (visited Oct 4,
2010) ("UDHR").
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Member States to protect rights that humans naturally possess and that are
fundamental to living a dignified human life.3 Since these rights owe their origin
to the nature of human beings and not to the structure of a state, no state should
deprive its citizens of these fundamental human rights.'
Recent international developments raise the question of whether
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation is included in the
UDHR. In particular, this Comment will consider whether Article 2 of the
UDHR (which protects against discrimination on the basis of, among other
things, race, color, sex, national origin, or "other status") protects against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
First, this Comment will discuss the importance of this question in the UN
today. Second, this Comment will analyze whether protection based on sexual
orientation is included in the UDHR based on the text and case law under the
UDHR. But because these approaches do not conclusively answer the question
of whether protection based on sexual orientation is included in the UDHR, this
Comment will also adopt an approach from political philosophy. This approach
will evaluate which types of discrimination are theoretically permissible under a
document otherwise concerned with promoting equality.
Using the work of Mill, Locke, and Rawls, this Comment will analyze
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation from two
alternative positions. The first considers whether discrimination based on sexual
orientation may be necessary to the stability of non-oppressive states. The
second considers whether such discrimination may be justified behind a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance.
Combined, these approaches will demonstrate that the right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation is a right that is in
tension with the stability of some non-oppressive religious states, and the right
against discrimination gains little support from the Rawlsian veil of ignorance.
Protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, therefore, is not
included in the UDHR.
3 Id ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.").
4 Id.
5 Id ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
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II. RELEVANCE OF THIS DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS
TODAY
More than one half-century after drafting the UDHR, and almost two
decades after the watershed Toonen decision (discussed in Section III.C), the UN
is still debating whether laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
constitute an impermissible denial of equal protection according to Articles 2
and 29 of the UDHR.
On December 18, 2008, a representative of Argentina, on behalf of a
number of associated countries, presented a Declaration on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity to the UN.6 The Declaration stated that, consistent with
Article 29 of the UDHR, rights must be applied equally to all human beings,
regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.'
Also on December 18, 2008, a representative of Syria made a general
statement on behalf of a number of associated countries. The representative
recognized that the protection of universal human rights is a continuing struggle.
However (or perhaps consistent with this observation), the representative
maintained that protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity is within the jurisdiction of individual states.
According to Syria's general statement, Article 29 of the UDHR prohibits
protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and
Argentina's Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Human Rights has no legal
basis.'
Underlying the disagreement over the interpretation of Article 29 is a
disagreement over whether sexual orientation deserves protection under Article
2 of the UDHR. This Comment will argue that if discrimination based on sexual
orientation is necessary to the creation or stabilization of some non-oppressive
states, then sexual orientation is not a protected characteristic under Article 2 of
the UDHR. Consistent with Syria's declaration, discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is within the jurisdiction of individual states and may be based
on each state's moral principles.
Determining which rights are included in the UDHR can have
consequences for all members of the UN. First, States can bring claims against
other States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
6 GeneralAssemby Adopts 52 Resolutions, Six Deciions Recommended by a Third Committee on Wide Range of
Human Rsghts, Social Humanitanan Issues, GA/10801 (UN 2008), online at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gal0801.doc.htm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
7 Id.
8 Id.
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(ICCPR),' and individuals can bring claims under the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR.10 Therefore, the status of sexual orientation under Articles 2 and 29 will
determine which laws can be challenged in front of the UN Human Rights
Committee. Second, the UDHR is an important tool of customary international
law. The status of sexual orientation under Articles 2 and 29 may be applicable
to decisions by the International Court of Justice" and it may be used to
pressure states to overturn discriminatory laws.
III. TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
A. Statutory Background
The UDHR protects against certain forms of discrimination. Article 2
states in part: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status."12
Article 2, however, must be read in the context of Article 29. The latter
states in part:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.13
The most popular argument for including sexual orientation under Article 2 is
that sexual orientation is a protected "other status." 4 This is a broad reading of
Article 2, however, and Article 29 explains that the UDHR is not unboundedly
protective. In particular, rights and freedoms may be restricted for the purpose
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res No 2200A (XXI),
UN Doc A/6316, 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976)
("ICCPR").
10 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly
Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 59, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UN Treaty
Ser 302 (Mar 23, 1976).
" Statute of the International Court ofJustice, Art 38(1)(b), 59 Stat 1055, Treaty Ser No 993 (1945)
("The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply. . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.").
12 UDHR (cited in note 2).
13 Id.
14 See generally Vincent J. Samar, Gay-R;ghts as a Paricular Instantiation of Human Rghts, 64 Albany L
Rev 983 (2001).
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of securing the rights of others, or for ensuring morality, public order, and
general welfare.
B. Modern Analysis of Articles 2 and 29
Article 29 is a general limiting clause that allows Member States to limit the
scope of the UDHR's enumerated rights. But it is also clear from experience and
the general text of the UDHR that the UDHR does not protect everything that
may be characterized as a "right." Does Article 29 then provide a basis for
determining not only when some rights may be abridged, but also which rights
are excluded from the UDHR? Can the Article, by its words alone, play this dual
role?
Many interpretations of Article 29 indicate that it can. For example, if
Article 29 represents a maxim that "no-one is entitled to act for the destruction
of human rights or to jeopardize the human rights of others," this maxim may
apply both in limiting the scope of certain enumerated rights, and deciding
which rights should be protected in the first instance."
Consider also the position that "human rights norms are procedural and
contextual, and they were never intended to impose single global solutions on
widely divergent societies."' 6 This strongly suggests that Article 29 should be
understood in the context of cultural relativism (discussed in more detail below
in Section IV.A), which means that protecting some rights at the extreme, and
other rights at all, must be left to the discretion of individual Member States.
The previous two positions are general interpretations of Article 29 that
suggest that it may not only limit the scope of enumerated rights, but may also
provide a basis for deciding which rights to include in the UDHR at all.
However, these positions are not sufficiently specific to answer the instant
question: is a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation
included in the UDHR? Not necessarily, for the reasons explained below.
First, permitting discrimination based on sexual orientation is consistent
with the idea that all limitations on human rights must be based on generally
applicable rules. "Limitations on human rights must be.. .both subject-general,
that is, not under-inclusive with respect to prohibited criteria of discrimination,
and (in most cases at least) occasion-general."" But discrimination based on
sexual orientation may be permitted consistent with the UDHR in much the
15 B.G. Ramcharan, Individual, Collective and Group Rights: Histoy, Theof, Practice and Contemporay
Evolution, 1 Intl J Group Rts 27, 41 (1993-1994).
16 Hurst Hannurn, Book Review: Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 97 Am J Intl L 1006, 1009 (2003).
17 Oscar M. Garibaldi, General Limitations on Human Rights: The Pnnctble of Legality, 17 Hary Intl L J
503, 557 (1976).
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same way as the freedom of speech may be constitutionally restricted in the US.
Whatever the proffered reason for allowing such discrimination (and there must
be a reason), the discrimination allowed must be narrowly tailored to the
reason' 8 and not based on an ad-hoc contextual determination.
Some theories also suggest looking to standard UN practice to determine
permissible limitations on the UDHR." UN case law on discrimination based on
sexual orientation is discussed below. But in the context of generally permissible
discrimination, Erica-Irene Daes suggests the following: "differential treatment
is justified if it has an objective aim, derived from the public interest, and if the
measures of differentiation do not exceed a reasonable relation to that aim." 20
To give context to this standard, especially in relation to discrimination
based on sexual orientation, consider the following other comments from Daes.
First, "[d]emocracy was defined [at the Commission on Human Rights] as
government of the people, by the people, for the people."21 Second, "the
individual's rights ought to be subordinated to those of the national community
and the international community," 22 indicating that the "public interest"
mentioned in the previous paragraph may be defined by any significant interest
of a democracy. Third, "[m]orality being the noblest product of culture, it is the
duty of all to respect it,,, 23 indicating that morality may be a significant state
interest. And fourth,
[t]here is a fundamental difference between the law that expresses a moral
principle and the law that is only a social regulation. .. An individual [or
State] cannot be considered as accepting a "moral" principle or a "moral"
rule unless he is making a serious attempt to use it in guiding his particular
moral judgements [sic] and thus his actions.24
Together, these comments suggest that upholding morality may be a significant
and objective state interest that justifies differential treatment. Discrimination
based on sexual onentation is consistent with the UDHR as long as: (1) allowing
this kind of discrimination is reasonably related to a democracy's interest in
upholding morality; and (2) the moral judgment is a bonafide one.
18 See RA. V. v Oty of St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992) (holding that the St. Paul ordinance was
unconstitutional because it made content-based distinctions that were narrower than the full
category of low-value speech).
19 See John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 Harv Ind L J 171, 200 (1998)
(supporting this view).
20 Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Law at 133 (cited in note 1).
21 Id at 72.
22 Id at 70.
23 Id at 120.
24 Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Law at 120-21 (cited in note 1).
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Consider a state whose government is predicated on certain moral
principles, including a religion that does not support homosexuality. Under the
previously described view, that state may discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation as long as the discrimination is directly related the state's objective
aim, namely, promoting its welfare through morality.
But this conclusion may be uncomfortably broad; there is a wide range of
democratic states and a wider range of "significant and objective interests" of
those states under the preceding definition. Because Article 29 plays a dual role
of both determining which rights are protected by the UDHR and determining
the degree to which the UDHR protects rights, there is a risk that any right
(even an enumerated right) could be curtailed based on the significant moral
interest of a member state. Accordingly, this Comment will continue to analyze
the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation based
on the case law interpreting the UDHR. But, because there is only a small
amount of case law, this Comment will also use two theoretical approaches to
evaluate whether this right is included in the UDHR. The theoretical approaches
will look more closely at the definitions of "democratic state" and "significant
and objective interests" discussed above, in an attempt to narrow these
definitions.
C. Precedent Set by Case Law
The UDHR is not binding international law. However, the UDHR was
given force through, among other things, the ICCPR. Under the ICCPR, states
may bring communications (or claims) against other states before the UN
Human Rights Committee.25 The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows
individuals to bring claims before the UN Human Rights Committee as well.26
Cases brought under the Optional Protocol may help to sharpen the analysis of
the right against discrimination based on sexual orientation under the UDHR.
In 1991, Tasmanian resident and gay activist Nicholas Toonen challenged a
Tasmanian law banning homosexual activity before the UN Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Tasmanian law criminalized all
forms of sexual contact between homosexual men.27 First, Mr. Toonen claimed
that the law constituted an unlawful or arbitrary interference with his privacy,
25 ICCPR (cited in note 9).
26 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (cited in note 10).
27 Tasmanian Criminal Code §§ 122(a), 122(c), 123 (1997). These provisions have since been
repealed. Justice Michael Kirby, The Future of Criminal Law, Some Big Issues, Criminal Lawyer's
Association Northern Territory Bali Conference (June 28, 1999), online at
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyjcrimin.htm (visited Nov 9, 2010).
Vol. 11 No. 2796
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contrary to Article 17 of the ICCPR. Second, he claimed that he had been
deprived of equal protection, contrary to Article 26 of the ICCPR.
Article 26 of the ICCPR is very similar to Article 2 of the UDHR. It states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. 28
In 1994, the UN Human Rights Committee held that the Tasmanian law
violated Toonen's right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR.2 9 However,
this holding did little to clarify the meaning of "other status" under Article 26 of
the ICCPR or Article 2 of the UDHR. First, the decision was limited to the right
to privacy and did not extend more broadly to discrimination based on sexual
orientation.30 Second, the Committee considered discrimination based on sexual
orientation to be the same as discrimination based on sex, and not
discrimination based on "other status,"" the relevant classification to the
discussion in this Comment.
Interestingly, neither party in the Toonen case argued that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is equivalent to discrimination based on sex.32
33This argument is rarely used in the debate over sexual orientation, and it is a
disfavored argument in US jurisprudence.34 So while the Toonen decision
indicates that the UN Human Rights Committee is (possibly) interested in
expanding protections based on sexual orientation, the precedent set by the
opinion is narrow. It leaves open an avenue for increased protections so long as
parties are comfortable arguing that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
the same as discrimination based on sex. But it does not clarify the meaning of
28 ICCPR, Art 26 (cited in note 9).
29 United Nations, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, para 4, of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Poltical Rights, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994)
("Toonen Decision").
30 Id § 8.2.
31 Id § 8.7.
32 Id.
33 But see United Nations Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the
Optional Protocol with regard to the case of Young v. Austrailia 5 10.4, UN Doc
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003).
3 Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558. While the court stuck down a law prohibiting sodomy as an
unconstitutional infringement on individual rights, the majority did not consider the sodomy law
discrimination based on sex. Instead, it based its decision on the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Id at 564.
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"other status" under Article 2 of the UDHR, which is where future litigation
over homosexual rights is most likely to focus.1 5
IV. AN APPROACH FROM POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE
HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS DISTINCTION
A. Introduction
This section will argue that because the UDHR allows for some form of
cultural relativism, the UDHR is limited to protecting human rights, as opposed
to civil rights. This section will further argue that civil rights are rights that owe
their creation and protection to the state, whereas human rights are rights that all
humans possess prior to the creation of the state. In particular, this section will
argue that civil rights are any rights that may be at odds with how a non-
oppressive or democratic state chooses to create and stabilize its government.
Human rights, by contrast, are any rights that cannot be at odds with how a non-
oppressive state chooses to create and stabilize its government. This Comment
will use the political philosophies of John Locke"6 and Thomas Hobbes3 7 to
define a "non-oppressive state" as one that rules by consent of the governed,
demonstrated by: (1) a citizenry's option of non-consent, and (2) the citizenry's
failure to exercise that option.
The question of whether the right not to be discriminated against on the
basis of sexual orientation is a human or civil right will be evaluated under both
a historical and theoretical approach. The historical approach evaluates whether
any modern non-oppressive states must discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation for the purposes of state formation or continued state stability. The
theoretical approach evaluates whether a non-oppressive state may need to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the process of its formation or
for continued state stability.
Alternatively, the distinction between human and civil rights may be
analyzed behind a Contractarian38 or Rawlsian39 veil. This method has the
advantage of analyzing the right in question (the right not to be discriminated
3 GeneralAssembly Adopts 52 Resolutions (cited in note 6).
36 See generallyJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett 1980) (C.B. MacPherson ed).
3 See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin 1986).
38 The political theory, which holds that "legitimate authority of government must derive from the
consent of the governed, where the form and content of this consent derives from the idea of
contract or mutual agreement." Ann Cudd, Contractaianism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford
Englopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008), online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/contractarianism (visited Oct 4, 2010).
3 See generaaly John Rawls, A Theog ofjustice (Oxford revd 1991).
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against on the basis of sexual orientation) directly. But it has the disadvantage of
being only a rough application of Rawlsian political theory.40 This Comment will
use the Rawlsian approach only to provide support for the primary method of
analysis, by demonstrating that a consistent result may be reached from a
different philosophical position.
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Respects
Cultural Relativism
The first step in the theoretical analysis is to analyze whether the UDHR
respects cultural relativism. Membership in the UN is open to all "peace-loving
states" that accept the obligations contained in the UN Charter and are able and
willing to carry out its obligations.4 1 However, not all "peace-loving" signatories
to the UDHR comply with its requirements. Saudi Arabia prohibits trade unions,
for example, in violation of Article 23.42 This means that the UN recognizes that
Member States must evolve in order to fulfill the requirements of the UDHR.
In order to work toward satisfying the UDHR, Member States must
selectively rid themselves of norms that violate human rights. However, these
states cannot do so at the cost of their stability. As peace-loving Member States
evolve to comply with the UDHR, states must be able to maintain some of the
cultural norms that stabilize the states themselves, sometimes temporarily and
sometimes permanently. In other words, some respect for cultural relativism is
required under the UDHR.
There are three arguments against the view that the UDHR respects
cultural relativism. All of these arguments, however, are ultimately unsuccessful.
First, the protections contained in the UDHR are said to supersede the laws of
any state.43 However, this argument means that the only rights worth protecting
through the UDHR are those that can and should be attained universally. The
UDHR supports cultural relativism, just not with respect to the rights contained
within it.
Second, Sophie Clavier warns that cultural relativism "adopts a static
definition of culture: a snapshot of a group of people and their system of
meaning at a given time with the underlying assumption that they will not
40 Id at 118.
41 UN Charter, Arts 3-6.
42 International Trade Union Confederation, 2007 Annual Survy of Violations of Trade Union Rights,
online at http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=SAU&IDLang=EN (visited
Oct 4, 2010).
43 See Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (UN 1995), online at
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change,"" and this static definition may be in tension with the UDHR emphasis
on evolution. However, evolution and cultural relativism are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, they are often mutually reinforcing. Member States will never
evolve toward the goals of the UDHR if they feel disenfranchised from the
organization or agreement that enforces those norms. This risk of
disenfranchisement is particularly high in international law, where enforcement
mechanisms are weak. If non-relativists wish to eventually see a homogeneous
world, they must try to understand and respect the heterogeneity that currently
exists, so that they may help and encourage states to evolve to meet their
standards. Folding cultural relativism into the UDHR provides a simple formula
for states to evolve toward compliance with the explicit terms of the UDHR
itself-in return for changing those practices that violate the UDHR, a state may
maintain its stability and cultural identity by retaining practices that do not
violate the UDHR.
Third, the UHDR appears to champion a view that eventually all rights
(both civil and human) will be universal.45 However, this is not a problem for
cultural relativism for two reasons. First, even if the UDHR wants all rights to
be universal, it clearly prioritizes the universality of human rights. Therefore, it is
consistent with the UDHR to respect cultural relativism while states evolve into
compliance with the human rights protected by the UDHR. Second, drafting
history demonstrates that Western states had a disproportionate impact on the
language of the UDHR.46 In fact, at the 1993 Conference on Human Rights, a
delegation (again led by Syria) put forth the following conclusions:
1. Human Rights as currently defined are not universal but based on
Western morality.
2. They should not therefore be imposed as norms on non-western societies
in disregard of those societies' historical and economic development and in
disregard of their cultural differences and perceptions of what is right and
wrong.
44 Sophie Clavier, Human Rights and the Debate Beveen Universalism and Cultural Relativsm (San
Francisco State University), online at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/-sclavier/research/hrdebate.pdf
(visited Oct 4, 2010).
45 Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, Introduction to the Universal Declaration on Human Rzghts (UN
2008), online at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avi/ha/udhr/udhr.html (visited Oct 4, 2010) ("[T]he
holistic view of all rights to be proclaimed promptly prevailed.").
46 For more on this, see Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human
RightsLaiw, 71 U Chi L Rev 1689, 1693 (2004), citing Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in
the Muslim World: Socio-pok6ical Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 Harv Hum Rts J 13, 15 (1990)
("Relativists reminded universalists that most non-Western states did not participate in the
drafting of the UDHR because, as subjects of colonialism, they were not members of the UN.
Thus, relativists argue that the human rights regime's assumption of universalism has a cultural
bias, favoring Western norms derived from Enlightenment-era philosophy.").
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3... . [T]he imposition of one's standard on another culture is unjust and
imperialist in nature.47
While this Comment does not support Syria's 1993 declaration, the
declaration does provide some important insights. First, it emphasizes the
danger of allowing states to feel disenfranchised in the search for human
rights-they may abandon the project altogether. Second, recognizing the
UDHR's Western influence helps a reader to understand why the UDHR does
not explicitly recognize the need to respect cultural relativism en route to the
protection of human rights. Most Western societies are very close to attaining
the goals of the UDHR, and they do not need to maintain unpopular regimes in
order to evolve toward the UDHR's goals. However, for many non-Western
states, political stability requires maintaining programs that may seem
controversial to a majority of other nations in order to evolve toward
compliance with the UDHR.
C. The Measure of a Non-Oppressive State is One That Rules
by Consent of the Governed
Sophie Clavier also reminds us that "cultural relativism is claimed by
repressive regimes whose practices have nothing to do with local or indigenous
cultures but more with their own self-preservation."4 8 Any position that respects
cultural relativism must distinguish between practices that are important to the
history and culture of a country, and those that are in place merely to oppress.
The question presented by this Comment is whether discriminating against
someone on the basis of sexual orientation can be an important cultural norm,
or whether it is one that is merely used as part of a larger scheme of political
oppression. In order to answer this question, this Comment must first define a
non-oppressive state. It can then finally define civil rights, by evaluating which
practices are necessary to such a state's stability.
Oppression in political philosophy can mean a number of things. For
Hobbes, it was the state of nature where humans gained power through force
rather than consent.49 Modern philosophers"o define oppression as illegitimate
and arbitrary laws that cause material (economic or physical) deprivation." And,
contemporary writers focus on non-formal oppression by social groups,
47 Clavier, Debate Between Universalism and Cultural Relatvism at 1-2 (cited in note 44).
48 Id at 5.
49 Hobbes, Leviathan at 186 (cited in note 37) (famously stating the life of man in the state of nature
is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.").
50 1600-1800 A.D.
5 Ann E. Cudd, Analying Oppression 5-7 (Oxford 2006).
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through, for example, disparity in wealth.5 2 Since the definition of oppression is
not firm, this Comment will take a minimal (Hobbesian) view of the term: an
oppressive state rules by force, as opposed to consent. For the purposes of this
Comment, this view is interchangeable with Locke's consent theory: political
authority is legitimate only if it has the consent of those who are subject to its
commands.
Consent to a political regime entails, at the least: (1) the option of non-
consent,5 4 and (2) a failure to exercise that option." Some worry that such
consent (tacit consent) is not sufficient for political authority," but it is difficult
to formulate a theory that accounts for when and how citizens can explicitly
consent to a political regime." An explicit consent view will also suffer from the
main weaknesses of the tacit consent theory: inertia, cognitive bias, and
incomplete information. Therefore, the best working definition is as follows: for
a state to have consent of the governed, the citizens must choose not to exercise
a viable option of non-consent (rebellion or relocation, for example).
Non-consent may be extraordinarily costly, but consent given to avoid
costs of non-consent is consent nonetheless." If a government physically
restrains a citizen, on the other hand, it deprives that citizen of the option of
rebellion or relocation. Therefore, citizens have the option of non-consent short
of physical restraint or incapacitation due to mental restraint, inertia, cognitive
bias, or incomplete information.
52 Id at 9 (discussing Hegel and Marx).
53 Tom Christiano, Authoriy, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Englopedia of Philosophy § 4.1 (Fall
2008), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fal2008/entries/authority/ (visited Oct 4,
2010), citing Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (cited in note 36).
54 Id § 4.3, citing John A. Simmons, Justificaion and Legiimay: Essays on Rights and Obligadons
(Cambridge 2001).
5 Id § 4.8, citing Locke, Second Treatise of Government (cited in note 36).
56 Edward A. Harris, Note, From Social Contract to Hypotheical Agreement: Consent and the Obligation to
Obey the Law, 92 Colum L Rev 651, 679 (1992) ("In shifting from express and tacit consent to
hypothetical agreement, contemporary social contract theorists have given up on the task of
securing a sufficient account of political obligation.").
5 See John A. Simmons, MoralPrinafles and Politcal Obhgations 57-74 (Princeton 1979).
58 Christiano, Authority § 4.9 (cited in note 53) (rebutting Hume's concern-that no one can sensibly
interpret the voluntary continued residence of a person in a state as a case of tacit consent due to
the cost of moving-by arguing that "many people consent to things in order to avoid the terrible
costs of not consenting").
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D. Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation May Be
Necessary to the Stability of Non-Oppressive States: A
Historical and Theoretical Approach
The project of this Comment is to find non-oppressive political regimes
that must discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in order to create or
stabilize their governments. If such discrimination is necessary for the stability of
non-oppressive states, the UDHR should allow such discrimination so that these
states can remain stable while working toward achieving the UDHR's other
goals.
This project takes both a historical and theoretical approach. A historical
approach will seek to find an actual state that: (1) discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation, (2) derives its authority through consent of its citizens, and
(3) requires discrimination based on sexual orientation to support its consented-
to political regime. In order to respect the costliness of non-consent mentioned
earlier, a historical approach should consider states that have: (1) no history of
rebellion under the current political regime, (2) no recent rebellions under the
current political regime, (3) no history of mass migrations, and (4) no recent
mass migrations.
The historical approach, if successful, will demonstrate that states are
capable of satisfying all three elements. Accordingly, it will demonstrate that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may be necessary to the stability
of a non-oppressive state. If this can be shown, then a right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation is a civil right, and not
protected by the UDHR.
Consider, for example, Turkey. The Turkish constitution does not protect
homosexual citizens from discrimination." Turkey prohibits homosexuals and
bisexuals from serving in the military, and has a history of other discriminatory
practices.o Turkey is also a republican parliamentary democracy without a
history of rebellion or mass migration. Finally, with a population that is over 99
5 Turkish Parliament justice Commission Rules Out Anti-disiminaion Proposal, (Turkey LGBT History
2004), online at http://news.kaosgl.com/turkeyjgbtjhistory.php (visited Oct 4, 2010) (Turkish).
60 In 1996 the Supreme Court deprived a lesbian woman of custody of her child on the grounds that
the mother was "a woman who has a [sexual] habit in the degree of sickness," and in 2006 a
LGBT magazine was banned under a law protecting the general morality. Id.
61 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Turkey (CIA 2007), online at
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percent Muslim,6 2 discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may be
necessary to support the current political regime.
The example of Turkey, however, may be insufficient for a few reasons.
First, Turkey already exhibits tolerance for homosexual activities in some
instances. For example, sodomy is not a crime in Turkey." Second, Turkey is
increasingly sensitive to the problems of discriminating against individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation, especially as it struggles to become part of the
EU.64 These facts demonstrate that it may not be necessary for Turkey to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
Alternately, a theoretical approach may be employed to evaluate whether
the three elements are, in theory, compatible. For this approach, consider a
country that satisfies two of the three elements and ask whether it might satisfy
the third. For example, the US currently discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation 61 and is also a non-oppressive state. Such discrimination is probably
not required for the stability of the US,66 given its strong culture of tolerance and
62 Id. This Comment recognizes that discrimination based on sexual orientation may be a bigger
problem in Muslim countries than Catholic-majority countries such as Mexico or Italy. However,
the fact that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not necessary to the stability of Catholic
countries does not undermine the conclusion that it may be necessary to the stability of Muslim
countries. As a note on the distinction between treatment of homosexuality in Muslim and non-
Muslim countries, consider that as of 2007, all of the countries that applied the death penalty to
homosexual acts were Muslim countries. World Day Against Death Penaly (International Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association Oct 10, 2007), online at
http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1111 (visited Oct 4, 2010).
63 See India: Court Strikes Down 'Sodomy' La (Human Rights Watch July 2, 2009), online at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/02/india-court-strikes-down-sodomy-law (visited Oct 4,
2010).
6 European Commission: Enlargement, EU-Turkey Relations, online at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu-turkeyjrelations en.htm
(visited Oct 4, 2010).
65 See CitiZens for Equal Protection v Bruning, 455 F3d 859, 871 (8th Cir 2006) ("laws limiting the state-
recognized institution of marriage to heterosexual couples are rationally related to legitimate state
interests and therefore do not violate the Constitution of the United States"). But see Pery v
Schwagenegger, 704 F Supp 2d 921 (ND Cal 2010) (holding California's Proposition 8
unconstitutional because "excluding same-sex couples from marriage is simply not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest"). The latter case may significantly impact the US's approach
to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
66 This debate is not entirely settled. Some maintain that such discrimination is necessary to the
stability of the US, given the importance of the Judeo-Christian morality to the country's
founding. Others disagree that the Judeo-Christian morality had much of an impact on the culture
and laws of the US. And still others maintain that whatever the historical arguments, such a
morality should not and does not control today. Overall, there may be no fact of the matter about
which norms lay at the foundation of American jurisprudence, historically or presently. For more
on this, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court: 1982 Term, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 46 (1983-1984)
("The range of meaning that may be given to every norm-the norm's interpretability-is defined
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religious pluralism. Even in the US, however, maintaining a certain national
culture is important for stability and the protection of rights. And this political
culture could have very easily been one that did not support religious pluralism.
Robin Lovin notes:
[T]he necessary political arrangements for the emergence of normative
religious pluralism were themselves grounded in religious thought about
political life. In retrospect, it is not surprising that religious pluralism
flourished in the North American contexts where this Protestant political
thought had the widest following.
The US does not need to maintain discrimination in order to be internally
consistent with the rest of its political and social values. Another country,
however, may easily have such a need. The laws of the US are as much a product
of national culture as the laws of Turkey. While they may differ substantially in
substance, the difference may be a mere historical accident.
For an alternative application of the theoretical approach, consider Syria.
Syria also satisfies two of the three elements discussed above. First, Syrian law
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.68 Second, this discrimination is a
key part of the political culture necessary to the country's stability because it
reflects Muslim norms with regard to sexual orientation.6 ' But Syria is an
"oppressive" state because of the presence of both internal conflict and
substantial limitations on the option of non-consent.7 0
Syria's discriminatory laws, however, may not be a result of its classification
as an oppressive state. Internal conflict in Syria is mostly attributable to conflict
between Muslim sects," all of which condemn homosexuality.7 2 Syria's
discriminatory laws may be a product of its authoritarian military-dominated
government, but the presence of similar laws in non-authoritarian countries
... both by a legal text, which objectifies the demand, and by the multiplicity of implicit and
explicit commitments that go with it.").
67 Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27 Miss Coll L Rev 91, 103 (2007-2008).
68 Sodomy is illegal in Syria. Sodomy Laws: Laws Around the World, online at
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/world/world.htm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
69 Syria is 90 percent Muslim and 10 percent Christian. Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook: Syria (CIA 2007), online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sy.html (visited Oct 4, 2010).
70 Id (describing Syria's government as a "republic under an authoritarian military-dominated
regime").
71 Kurdish Unrest Erupts in Syna (BBC News June 6, 2005), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4612993.stm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
72 Religion Facts: Homosexuality and Islam, online at
http://www.religionfacts.com/homosexuality/islam.htm (visited Oct 4, 2010). See also Khalid
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makes this a weaker argument.3 Theoretically, there may be a state in which
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a key part of the political
culture necessary to the country's stability but which does not maintain an
oppressive and authoritarian government. But, comparisons to Syria provide
additional theoretical support for the theory that a non-oppressive state may
need to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
V. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH FROM POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY:THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AND THE
CONTRACTARIAN VEIL
A. Introduction
The preceding discussion reasoned backward into a distinction between
human and civil rights by evaluating the necessary behavior of a non-oppressive
state. This section, by contrast, will reason forward from an intuitive definition
of human rights. Using the work of Alan Gewirth and John Rawls, this section
will evaluate the rights humans possess due to their nature and inherent dignity,
and whether the right against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
one such right.
B. A Theoretical Basis for Human Rights
In Human Rights: Essays on justifications and Applicaions,74 Alan Gewirth
argues that human rights are derived from human rationality. Gewirth sets up
the argument by proposing that all rational agents have purposes or ends, and
they rationally desire whatever goods are necessary to achieve those ends.
[A]s rational, [the agent] regards as necessary goods the proximate general
necessary conditions of his acting to achieve his purposes. For without
these conditions he either would not be able to act for any purposes or
goods at all or at least would not be able to act with any chance of
succeeding in his purposes. These necessary conditions of his action and
successful action are freedom and well-being.
If an agent desires anything, he will also, logically, desire what is
instrumental (whatever may serve as a means or agency) to his desires. The
instrumental goods that are necessary to achieve an agent's purposes are, then,
necessary in themselves. If they are necessary, others must be prevented from
73 Turkish Parkament Jusde Commission Rules Out Ani-disimination Proposal (cited in note 59).
74 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on justifications andApplicaions (Chicago 1982).
7 Id at 47.
Vol 11 No. 2806
Sexual Orientaion, Discriminaion, and the Universal Declaraion of Human Rights
interfering with them. In other words, an agent has a right to goods necessarily
instrumental to his desires.
Under Gewirth's account, rights are necessarily instrumental goods based
on the unique attributes and desires of human agents-rationality and the ability
to plan for the future. And, because all humans possess these two attributes,
rights apply equally to all humans.
There is one, and only one, ground that every agent logically must accept as
the sufficient justifying condition for his having the generic rights, namely,
that he is a prospective agent who has purposes he wants to fulfil . .. To
avoid contradiction, every agent must hold that being a prospective
purposive agent is a sufficient reason or condition for having the generic
rights. Because of this sufficient reason, every agent, on pain of self-
contradiction, must also accept the generalization that all prospective
purposive agents have the generic rights. This generalization is an
application of the logical principle of universalizability: if some predicate P
belongs to some subject S because S has the quality Q, then it logically
follows that every subject that has Q has P.76
Therefore, Gewirth presents a unified defense of both equal rights and
universal rights that falls out of two essential human characteristics: rationality
and prospective thinking.
But Gewirth does not argue that agents have the right to all instrumental
goods, only the right to necessary ones. For Gewirth, freedom and well-being
are necessary instrumental goods for all rational agents,77 and this Comment
assumes that autonomy is a necessary precursor to both of these things.
Proceeding under Gewirth's account, humans have a right to autonomy and
whatever is necessary to secure it. The next question is whether freedom from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is necessary for human
autonomy.
C. The Costs of Non-Discrimination
At first glance, US jurisprudence seems to easily answer the question posed
above: protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
necessary to human autonomy. In Bowers v Hardwick," Justice Blackmun
dissented from a decision upholding a law prohibiting sodomy by arguing that,
"individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships with others."7  And more recently in Lawrence v Texas,so Justice
76 Id at 51-52 (parenthetical section omitted).
77 Id at 47.
78 478 US 186 (1986).
79 Id at 205 (Blackmun dissenting).
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Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, supported extending the right to
privacy to include the right to engage in homosexual sodomy in private by
noting:
Liberty gresumes an autonomy of self that includes ...certain intimate
conduct.
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.82
This holding is binding with regard to privacy law in the US, but the
Court's arguments do not conclusively answer the larger theoretical question: is
freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation necessary for human
autonomy? Both in the US and in countries throughout the world, citizens and
courts disagree on the answer to this question.
One reason for the disagreement is that protecting individuals from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has real costs. For example, as
in the earlier discussion of Turkey, some feel that prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation upsets a religiously based moral code. As Richard
Posner notes,
[t]o permit persons of the same sex to marry [a right that likely falls out of a
policy of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation] is to declare,
or more precisely to be understood by many people to be declaring, that
homosexual marriage is a desirable, even a noble, condition in which to
live.83
In countries with a religiously-based legal system,84 prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination may have the effect of undermining the coherence
and integrity of the laws, especially if the legal system is premised on a moral
code that condemns homosexuality.
But there is also a separate cost to consider: the cost of discomfort. Both
secular and religious countries take the cost of discomfort into account when
extending the protection of rights. In particular, the US discriminates against
nudists on this basis through public decency laws. Michael Levin explains the
reasoning as follows: "Societies respecting the diversity of individual tastes, as
ours professes to, let people shun what they find repulsive. Tolerance includes
81 Id at 562.
82 Id at 567.
83 Richard Posner, Sex and Reason 312 (Harvard 1992).
84 For example, Iran is an Islamic state or a "theocratic republic." CIA, The World Factbook Iran (CIA
2007), online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.htmi
(visited Nov 28, 2010).
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tolerating fences. Forcing people to put up with what they loathe is [a form of]
tyranny."85
Laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation differ
from laws opposing nudity in significant ways." However, both secular and
religious countries share a commonality on the question of rights: the costs of
discomfort are significant and recognized in the legal system.
The difficult task in both secular and religious countries is to figure out
when the costs of discomfort are a legitimate basis on which to discriminate
against individuals. As Cass Sunstein notes:
[Widespread moral disapproval is not always a legitimate basis for law;
consider the bans on miscegenation or discrimination against the mentally
retarded. The task for courts invoking irrationality in the context of
[discrimination based on sexual orientation] is to distinguish the contexts in
which moral disapproval is legitimate from those in which it is not.
The question of whether protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is necessary for autonomy is more complex than it might first
appear. Both secular and religious countries balance the extension of rights with
the cost that those rights may impose on society, including the cost of
discomfort. The right against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
however, will overcome these costs if this right is necessary for human
autonomy. To answer the question of which rights are fundamental to human
autonomy, this Comment now turns to a Contractarian perspective.
D. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation from a
Contractarian Perspective
In A Theory ofJustice, John Rawls attempts to derive the basic principles of
justice from an original position where parties to a social contract start from
behind a veil of ignorance." Parties in the original position do not know their
85 Lawrence M. Thomas and Michael E. Levin, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights 147 (Rowman &
Littlefield 1999).
86 See Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationshp andAffirmativeAction: The Covert Libertarianism of the
United States Supreme Court, 12 S Ct Econ Rev 75, 88-90 (2004). Richard Epstein points out one of
the most important differences: "[Laws against nudity] deal with actions in public spaces, where
the regulation of the commons gives the state more power than it has over private conduct. Think
of those norms as traffic norms, and then ask if there is a rule against holding hands whether it
could be applied to gay couples only. Direct interaction is one thing, objection to relations by
others is quite another." Email correspondence (Oct 13, 2009). It is difficult to allow the private
activity of homosexual marriage, for example, but disallow all public expressions of
homosexuality. Conferring rights on homosexuals in the private sphere recognizes and celebrates
homosexuality in a way that will have public costs.
87 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexualiy and the Constitution, 70 Ind L J 1, 6 (1994).
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place in society or the distribution of natural assets.89 Given these conditions, the
principles of justice agreed to "are the principles that free and rational persons
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality." 0 For Rawls, an equal original position is fundamental for arriving at
the proper principles of justice; the only way for rational individuals to decide
what is good is by starting from an equal position in deliberation.
Section V.C left off with a consideration of whether sexual orientation is
so fundamental to human autonomy that, at least under Gewirth's account, there
exists a human right not to be discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.
One way of evaluating this question may be to set up a theoretical construct
similar to Rawls' veil of ignorance, where ideally rational individuals can decide if
sexual orientation is sufficiently important to autonomy that it should be
protected as a human right. Remember that human rights "constitute] a law
anterior and superior to the positive law of civil society,"91 meaning the
protection of human rights is preferable over the stability of the state. Therefore,
the question behind the veil of ignorance is whether sexual orientation is so
integral to human autonomy that it should be protected even at the cost of state
stabilization.92 That is, whether a rational individual would choose to allow
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, not knowing whether or not he
would be a victim of such discrimination, in order to protect the stability of his
state and other human rights.
Rawls concludes that rational individuals would choose that "each person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others,"" but does tell us where
sexual orientation fits in this rubric. What we should look for out of Rawls's
approach, however, is not a definitive answer, but a better-defined question. In
particular, this approach provides theoretical support for asking whether a
person's sexual orientation is "so integral an aspect of one's identity [that] it is
not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or sexual
orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment"? 94
89 Id.
90 Id at 10.
91 Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the 'Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 6 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987).
92 See Gerald A. Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Libery, 11
Erkenntnis 5 (No 1 1977) ("How much equality would conflict with liberty in given circumstances
depends on how much people would value equality in those circumstances."). A necessary
corollary is how much people would value equality when faced with the possible costs, including
destabilizing a state.
93 Rawls, A Theory ofjustice at 53 (cited in note 39).
94 In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal 4th 757, 842 (Cal 2008).
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Unlike the approach taken in Section IV, this Comment does not purport
to provide a purely philosophical answer to this question. It is notable, however,
that even in the highly tolerant United States, courts come down on both sides
of this issue." The impact of this disagreement is that an idealized rational
individual may not choose to protect against discrimination based on sexual
orientation at the cost of state stabilization. In other words, protection from
discrimination based on sexual orientation may not be a human right under the
Contractarian perspective. While this is not a conclusive argument, it provides
qualified theoretical support for this same conclusion, arrived at through
different means, in Section IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
Michael Walzer reminds us that not all rights can stand above the state or
political organization. For some rights, we need the "community itself: culture,
religion, and politics. It is only under the aegis of these three that all the other
things we need become socially recognized needs and take on historical and
determinate form."" The more difficult task is to decide which rights come
before the state, and which ones owe their protection to its existence.
While the UDHR is an aspirational statement with regard to human rights,
it also respects cultural relativism. Because of this, discrimination based on
sexual orientation is properly left to the discretion of individual Member States
and not prohibited by Articles 2 and 29 of the UDHR.
In considering the preceding arguments, note that this Comment does not
condone any laws that allow for violence against homosexuals. The fact that
non-oppressive nations may discriminate or allow discrimination against
individuals based on certain characteristics does not mean that the government
may exercise force against these individuals for the same reason. While it is the
prerogative of each nation to create a criminal law, the criminal law must be
more careful and narrowly drawn than the civil law. Any state that imposes
severe criminal sanctions on minimally harmful activity cannot be called a
democratic or non-oppressive society under almost any interpretation.
This Comment concludes by noting that many forms of discrimination are
tolerated, and even celebrated, in the most liberal societies. For example, the US
discriminates against individuals on the basis of age,97 national origin,98 wealth,99
95 Id. See also Kerrqan v Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn 135 (Conn 2008); Conaway v Deane,
401 Md 219 (Ct App Md 2007).
96 Michael Walzer, Spheres offusice 65 (Basic Books 1983) (emphasis omitted).
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past criminal activity,'" and more. Various forms of discrimination are embraced
because they are necessary to protect overall culture and human rights. In other
words, not all rights can be protected at any cost, nor should they be. To
emphasize this point, simply consider that the USSR prided itself on the fact that
"socialist democracy grants to the workers the widest rights and liberties on the
basis of equality, without any discrimination whatsoever."' 0
See, for example, 26 USC § 3 ("Tax determined under tables, applicable to such taxable year,
which shall be prescribed by the Secretary and which shall be in such form as he determines
appropriate. In the table so prescribed, the amounts of the tax shall be computed on the basis of
the rates prescribed by section 1.").
100 See, for example, United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manuals,
online at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm (visited Oct 4, 2010).
101 Daes, Freedom of the Individual Under Law at 93 (cited in note 1).
Vol 11 No. 2812
